Humphrey v. Byron, 447 Mass. 322 (2006)

Citation: Humphrey v. Byron, 447 Mass. 322 (2006)
Parent Document: Humphrey v. Byron, 447 Mass. 322 (2006)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2006-07-21
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6579392/humphrey-v-byron/ ↗

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Our Young decision was rooted largely in the gradual departure from the common-law agrarian model of leases, which regarded a lease as a conveyance of property. Young v. Garwacki, supra at 164-165. In the residential context, “we have overthrown the doctrine of caveat emptor and the notion that a lease is a conveyance of property.” Id. at 168. Similarly, in the commercial context, we have recognized that the notion of a lease as a conveyance “no longer comports with the reality of the typical modem commercial lease, which is intended to secure the right to occupy improvements to the land rather than the land itself, and which usually contemplates a continuing flow of necessary services from landlord to tenant, services that are normally under the landlord’s control.” Wesson v. Leone Enters., Inc., 437 Mass. 708, 720 (2002), citing 1 M.R. Friedman, Leases § 1.1 (4th ed. 1997). The modem trend is to regard leases not “as ‘conveyances,’ [but] as contracts for the possession of property.” Wesson v. Leone Enters., Inc., supra at 717.

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