Skip to main content
INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

Section 17203

Citation
Section 17203
Parent Document
Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., 999 P.2d 718 (2000)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
2000-06-05

Other Sections in This Document (353)

Full Text

1,296 chars
Under existing precedent, the District Attorneys note, courts have discretion to require class-action-like procedures in particular UCL matters, although they are not required to do so. (See generally Fletcher, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 454, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51; see also Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal. App.4th 644, 660-661, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 419.) UCL actions often are formally incompatible with class treatment, as class plaintiffs must be "truly representative of the absent, unnamed class members" (Bartlett v. Hawaiian Village, Inc. (1978) 87 Cal. App.3d 435, 438, 151 Cal.Rptr. 392) while, in keeping with the UCL's broad remedial purposes, a private party has UCL standing regardless of whether he or she is directly aggrieved. (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 560-561, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086; Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211, 215, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660 (Children's Television).) The District Attorneys, therefore, quite understandably oppose any rigid restriction on fluid recovery such as the majority announces today, because such a restriction will severely limit the remedies available in a critical class of UCL actions—those brought by personally unaggrieved plaintiffs.