5
In her opposition and supplemental memorandum, Aprea
argued (as she does on appeal) that because section 685.040
authorizes attorneys’ fees for enforcement only if the underlying
judgment includes attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1033.5,
subdivision (a)(10)(A), which in turn only allows recovery of
attorneys’ fees as costs when authorized by contract, Nash and
O’Connor were not entitled to any additional fees for enforcement
of the judgment because the lease limited attorneys’ fees to
$1,000. Thus, Aprea argued, the statutory scheme “trumps [the]
merger doctrine” and “does not authorize collections above the
$1,000 limit incorporated by reference.”
After a hearing, on June 16, 2022, the trial court granted
the cost motion in part. The court allowed the cost items relating
to the abstract of judgment, judgment lien, writ of execution, and
filing fees, totaling $481, but denied the request for postjudgment
interest. The court found that Nash and O’Connor were entitled
to attorneys’ fees, but most of the claimed fees were incurred in
opposing Aprea’s motions to vacate and for reconsideration, not to
enforce the judgment. The court allowed Nash and O’Connor to
recover $27,240 in attorneys’ fees for the time spent litigating the
cost motion.
The trial court rejected Aprea’s argument that the $1,000
fee limitation in the lease barred Nash and O’Connor from
recovering additional attorneys’ fees. The court relied on the
holding in Globalist Internet Technologies, Inc. v. Reda (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273-1274 (Globalist) that a plaintiff’s
right to postjudgment fees is based on an award of fees in the