The terms of the court’s order appointing the receiver in this matter also support the view that the warranty of habitability claim should be considered in this foreclosure action. That order required the receiver to "make repairs necessary to the preservation of the property” and to give priority to "the correction of immediately hazardous and hazardous violations of housing maintenance laws”. It also provided for, inter alia, the purchase of "fuel for heating said premises and supplying hot water to the tenants thereof”, thereby implicitly presuming the operation of an adequate heating system. Further, the order expressly contemplated the incurring of obligations in excess of the money in the receiver’s hands, forbidding such obligations "without the prior approval of the Court”. The court, of course, may order the person who applied for the receiver—in this case, plaintiff bank—to pay for necessary expenditures in cases where the receiver lacks the funds to do so (CPLR 8004 [b]). No doubt it would be more convenient for the receiver, and for the bank which caused his appointment, if such necessary repairs were funded by rents paid by the tenants. But as this Court has noted, such a view would lead to the inequitable result of compelling tenants to advance funds for housing which they are not receiving (Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v Sartor, 109 AD2d 665; Matter of Schactman v State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 143 AD2d 53, lv denied 73 NY2d 707). A tenant who is not obliged to pay rent to a landlord for uninhabitable premises (Park W. Mgt. Corp. v Mitchell, 47 NY2d, at 327, supra) is, in our view, likewise spared from paying that same rent to another party.