that must be satisfied comprehensively. This ambiguity was potentially misleading.
See Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 874-76; Lake Hills, 198 Wn.2d at 224.
However, the county fails to demonstrate it was prejudiced by this instruction.
The county argues that prejudice should be presumed. However, “[i]n order to be
reversible, a misleading jury instruction must also be prejudicial. Unlike a clear
misstatement of law, prejudice is not presumed.” Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 876
(citation omitted) (citing Keller, 146 Wn.2d at 249-50). As the challenging party,
the county bears the burden to establish prejudice. Griffin v. W. RS, Inc.,
143 Wn.2d 81, 91, 18 P.3d 558 (2001); Lake Hills, 198 Wn.2d at 225-26.
Verduzco alleged the county both discriminated and retaliated against him;
under the WLAD, discriminating against a person who has opposed an act
of discrimination is a type of retaliation. RCW 49.60.210(1). The evidence presented
to the jury suggested a pattern of Verduzco complaining and the county responding:
Verduzco viewed the county’s responses as discriminatory and retaliatory
while the county characterized its actions as justified and disciplinary. Although
the WPI definitions may differ qualitatively in order to address different harms—
treating an employee adversely because of their status or treating them adversely
because of their complaint—in practical terms, many actions by employers could
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Verduzco v. King County
No. 103749-0
fall under both categories. E.g., Jin Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. Serv. Dist.—ESD 171,
189 Wn.2d 607, 615, 404 P.3d 504 (2017) (failure to hire may constitute both
discrimination and retaliation). Compare Alonso v. Qwest Commc’ns Co.,