9
subtenant, transferring a portion of the tenant’s interest in the lease to the subtenant, with the
tenant retaining a future right of reentry. (Cobb v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization
and Arbitration Bd. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 345, 352.) There was no evidence in the stipulated
facts of the requisites that Milton Reyes transferred any portion of his leasehold interest to
defendant or that defendant paid rent to Milton Reyes.8 In fact, if defendant was a sublessee,
her only obligation to pay rent would have been to Milton Reyes as the sublessor (Hartman
Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 232, 242), which conflicts with the basis of
the three-day notice—that defendant was delinquent in her rent obligations owed to plaintiff
“pursuant to the lease or rental agreement under which you hold . . . possession of the . . .
premises[.]”9
Rather than being a sublessee, the evidence and the law support the court’s conclusion
that defendant became an implied tenant in her own right. “Under the Costa-Hawkins Act,
‘[t]enancy’ includes the lawful occupation of property, . . .” (Cobb v. San Francisco
Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Bd., supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 352; accord, §
1954.51, subd. (f).) This definition is in accord with case law (Mosser, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th
at p. 516 [“One may become a tenant by occupancy with consent”]; Parkmerced, supra, 215
Cal.App.3d at pp. 494-495 [same]), and the SMRCCA which defines the term “tenant” as “[a]
tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee or any other person entitled under the terms of a rental
housing agreement[10] to the use or occupancy of any rental unit” (SMRCCA, art. XVIII, §
1801). “‘A permissive occupation of real estate, where no rent is reserved or paid and no time