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I part ways with the majority’s assertion that documentation is not necessary for each
individual act of domestic violence. The plain language of the statute, against the backdrop of
the legislative purpose for documentation, refutes the majority’s position. The defense
prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant based on “an act or acts” against the tenant of
domestic violence is available only if “[t]he act or acts of domestic violence . . . have been
documented.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161.3, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) In other words, to be
assertable as an affirmative defense, there are two prerequisites: (1) the termination of the
tenancy must be based on “an act or acts” of domestic violence; and (2) the “act or acts” must
be documented. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 782 (2009-2010 Reg.
Sess.) as amended June 10, 2010, pp. 1-2 [The legislation “[p]rohibits a landlord from
terminating a tenancy based upon an act or acts of domestic violence . . . against the tenant . . . ,
if the act or acts can be appropriately documented . . . .” (Italics added)]; Stats. 2010, ch. 626,
§ 4 [“This bill would . . . prohibit a landlord from terminating a tenancy or failing to renew a
tenancy based upon an act of domestic violence . . . against a protected tenant, as defined, . . .
when that act is documented, as specified . . . .” (Italics added)].) This interpretation is
consistent with the Legislature’s intent to prevent tenants from fabricating incidents of domestic
violence in order to fortify the defense. (See Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
2413 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) June 4, 2018, p. 7.) There is no statutory language or legislative
history standing for the proposition that the documentation of one isolated incident is sufficient
to allow a tenant to argue other undocumented incidents support the defense.
Third, the majority’s position does not hold water even if undocumented abuse,
occurring prior to the service of the three-day notice, could be used to provide a foundation for
the defense. The majority relies on a number of text messages sent by Singleton to the property
manager. Only the April 26 and 29, 2019 text messages predate the service of the three-day
notice. They consisted of photographs (taken on the date of the text messages) of Oscar’s
vehicle in Singleton’s parking spot (a nuisance cited in the three-day notice). During her direct
examination, Singleton was shown those text messages and asked questions about what they
depicted. The majority rely on Singleton’s reply to the following question: “And what were