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terminated from the program based on her failure to submit to the housing authority in a
timely manner the judgment in the unlawful detainer case and the corresponding
summons and writ of possession. The trial court correctly observed, however, that the
notice failed to sufficiently apprise Johnson of the additional grounds for her termination
from the program. While the notice indicates that Johnson committed serious and/or
repeated violations of her lease agreement, it fails to indicate the dates or details of the
purported violations.
The housing authority argues that in determining the adequacy of the notice, the
court should also have considered what transpired at the February 21, 2017 meeting and
the written meeting summary that was provided Johnson one month before the formal
notice. The housing authority relies on Goldberg, supra, 397 U.S. at page 268, in which
the court upheld a system which conveyed notice similar to that used by the housing
authority in this case. In Goldberg, the court explained, “New York employs both a letter
and a personal conference with a caseworker to inform a recipient of the precise
questions raised about his continued eligibility. Evidently the recipient is told the legal
and factual bases for the Department’s doubts. This combination is probably the most
effective method of communicating with recipients.” (Ibid.)
In Driver v. Housing Authority (2006) 289 Wis.2d 727 (Driver), cited by Johnson,
the court recognized that while “Goldberg might allow for ‘actual or constructive
notice,’ ” the federal regulations adopted to implement the section 8 program
“contemplated ‘an arguably higher standard of “what process is due.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 743,
citing Morales v. McMahon (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 184, 190.) The court explained that
the federal regulations “mandate written notice, and strict compliance is imperative as a
matter of law and public policy.” (Driver, at p. 732.) The court explained, “Because of
the informality surrounding the pre-termination hearing process, courts may have little or
no record upon which to ascertain the sufficiency of oral or other actual notice. . . . Faced
with such a sparse record, a section 8 recipient who attempts to establish that he or she
did not receive oral notice faces a nearly insurmountable task. Courts would likely infer
actual notice in many cases from the mere opportunity of the plaintiff to discover the