Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Citation
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Parent Document
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 2022-12-16
Other Sections in This Document (22)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
- Frazier v. Super. Ct. (2022)
Full Text
733 chars3
Under Birkenfeld and its progeny, a municipality may add or limit a substantive ground for
eviction but may not enact a procedural barrier that interferes with the summary procedure for a
landlord to recover possession of property pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 et seq.
(Foster v. Britton (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 929-933.) The distinction between a procedural and
substantive law in this context has been described as “elusive” and “‘“‘shadowy and difficult to draw’
in practice”’” (San Francisco Apartment Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 510, 516 & fn. 2), but there is a strong presumption against preemption (Rental Housing
Assn., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 752).