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$800 payment nor otherwise present any evidence contradicting it; plaintiff only asserted Foster
had not unequivocally stated plaintiff had not returned the $800 to him. 6
Thus, the factual issue of whether the partial payment had been returned to Foster
remained open and unresolved. In sum, the court did not expressly address whether the partial
payment, submitted after expiration of the three-day notice period but before the filling of the
complaint, and plaintiff’s acceptance and purported failure to return the payment constituted a
waiver.
On the basis of the record before us, we conclude Foster sufficiently presented evidence
that created a triable issue of material fact concerning waiver which the jury should decide.
Applicability of pandemic-related protections
Foster contends, because he was unable to pay the security deposit due to the pandemic,
Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.2, subdivision (A) (section 49.99.2(A)) prevented
plaintiff from evicting him. He acknowledges section 49.99.2(A) applies to a tenant’s inability
to pay rent. Nonetheless, in arguing the payment of the security deposit should be construed as
being synonymous to an advance payment of rent, Foster also recognizes his defense that he
was protected from eviction “rests on an arguable legal question regarding the proper
interpretation of Civil Code § 1950.5.”
‘“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] The well-
established rules for performing this task require us to begin by examining the statutory