Cited. 16 CA 379; 40 CA 577. Plaintiff provided no authority or per se rule equating violation of section with intentional infliction of emotional distress and court was not inclined to create such a rule. 61 CA 108. To ensure compliance with the purpose of the Fair Employment Practices Act, a teacher who is discharged for any of the reasons enumerated in Sec. 10-151(d) must be afforded the protections of this section. 142 CA 248. Legislature intended to make state discrimination laws coextensive with the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964; If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee, and if a defendant effectively rebuts the presumption of intentional discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's justification for the plaintiff's dismissal was merely pretextual. 211 CA 676. Regardless of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gross and the Second Circuit's decision in Natofsky, the motivating factor test remains the applicable causation standard under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. 213 CA 605. Subsec. (b)(1) by its plain and unambiguous terms does not prohibit disability discrimination by association. 226 CA 335.
Cited. 39 CS 528. Actions brought under section may include actions brought against police departments. 50 CS 420.
Former Subsec. (a):