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“collateral to the subject matter of the main litigation,” was final
as to the collateral matter, and required payment of money). But
the question here is whether the possession-only judgment is
appealable as a collateral order, not whether the damages award
would be appealable. In any event, the determination of
possession was not “‘“distinct and severable from the general
subject of the litigation”’”—the determination of the parties’
rights under the lease. (In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 419.)
Cases addressing the appealability of interim judgments in
bifurcated trials are instructive. Courts have consistently held
that interlocutory orders following the first phase of a trial, even
if fashioned as a judgment, are not appealable. For example, in
Baker v. Castaldi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 218, the trial court
bifurcated trial of the plaintiff’s claims for stealing antiques into
two phases—the first to address liability, compensatory damages,
and whether punitive damages were warranted, and the second
to determine the amount of punitive damages. At the conclusion
of the first phase, the trial court entered a “judgment” in favor of
the plaintiff that awarded compensatory damages and found
punitive damages were warranted in an amount to be assessed in
a “separate trial.” (Id. at p. 221) The defendants purported to
appeal from the judgment, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal, reasoning, “[I]t seems quite clear that the . . . ‘judgment’
was interlocutory. While a final judgment leaves no issue left for
future consideration except compliance [citation], the . . .
‘judgment’ did leave open an issue for future consideration: the
amount of punitive damages. Determining the amount of
punitive damages at a court trial seems quite clearly to be a type
of ‘“judicial action on the part of the court”’ that is ‘“essential to a