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motions for nonsuit, directed verdicts and jnovs is to allow a party to prevail as a matter of law
where the relevant evidence is already in.” (Fountain Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner’s
Assn. v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 743, 750, italics omitted.)
A trial court may grant these motions “only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence to
support it. [Citation.]” (Gonzales v. City of Atwater (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 929, 946; Adams v.
City of Fremont, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 262.) In reviewing the denial of these motions,
the appellate court, like the trial court, must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 263.) Where, as here, the motions “raise[] legal issues, such as the
application of law to undisputed facts or the interpretation of a statute, we review the trial
court’s ruling ‘under a de novo standard of review.’ [Citations.]” (Gonzales v. City of Atwater,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946-947.)
Statutory Interpretation
We are tasked to determine whether the rental agreement at issue conformed to the
requirements of section 1962, subdivision (a), and whether subdivision (c)’s prohibition applied
to plaintiff. This appeal then involves resolving questions of law based on undisputed facts,
and we review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (Krechuniak v. Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th
713, 723.)
In construing section 1962, we must “‘“‘“ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to
effectuate the purpose of the statute.”’”’” (De Vries v. Regents of the University of California
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 574, 593.) We begin, as always, with the statute’s actual words, the
“most reliable indicator” of legislative intent, “assigning them their usual and ordinary
meanings, and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs. On the
other hand, if the language allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look to such
aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction. In cases of
uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation,
including its impact on public policy. [Citations.]” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation