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holdover tenancy—that is, an unlawful detainer action—is a tort claim that it is beyond
the reach of section 1717. Prometheus is wrong again, as shown, for example, by
Mitchell Land & Improvement Co. v. Ristorante Ferrantelli, Inc., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th
479, holding that an unlawful detainer action based upon an “alleged breach of the lease
covenant concerning use of the premises during an unexpired term” was a contract action
for purposes of section 1717. (Id. at p. 488.)
The broad attorney fees provision in paragraph 23 does not restrict fees only to
claims arising due to a holdover after expiration of the lease. To the contrary, it applies
to virtually any situation under which Prometheus seeks to take action against its tenants.
So, for example, under this provision Prometheus could give notice and deem a tenant a
holdover for, among other things, nonpayment of rent, subletting, having a pet, causing a
disturbance—indeed, any minor violation of the lease. All that Prometheus would want
under the lease are possession and money. And it has given itself the right to collect
attorney fees in the pursuit of both. Section 1717 applies to give the Hjelms equal rights.
Prometheus Has Not Demonstrated That the Fee Award Should Be Reduced
Prometheus’s next argument is that the fee award “should be reduced, as the trial
court offered no reasoning for its award.” Prometheus also suggests a 0.163 multiplier,
based on the proportion of the economic loss to the total damage award. We are not
persuaded.
We set forth the applicable law in Calvo Fisher & Jacob LLP v. Lujan (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 608, 619–620:
“We have on many occasions set out the law and the standard of review when the
issue is the reasonableness of attorney fees awarded, most recently in Syers Properties
III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 697–698:
“ ‘The abuse of discretion standard governs our review of the trial court’s
determination of a reasonable attorney fee. [Citations.]
“ ‘ “Under the lodestar method, attorney fees are calculated by first multiplying
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate of
compensation. [Citations.]” ’