We entirely agree with the Housing Court’s conclusion that tenants are “non-purchasing tenants” within the meaning of the Martin Act. Admittedly, there are ambiguities and inconsistencies in the statute which lend support to the positions of both parties. On the one hand, the statute defines “[plurchaser under the plan” as the “person who owns the shares allocated to a dwelling unit” (General Business Law § 352-eeee [1] [d]) — a definition arguably broad enough to include a sponsor — and states that a “person who sublets a dwelling unit from a purchaser under the plan shall not be deemed a non-purchasing tenant” (General Business Law § 352-eeee [1] [e]). On the other hand, it defines “non-purchasing tenant” to include “a person to whom a dwelling unit is rented subsequent to the effective date” (General Business Law § 352-eeee [1] [e]), a definition which, after the exclusion of persons who rent from bona fide purchasers for occupancy, would seem to require the inclusion of persons who rent from sponsors. We are not persuaded by landlords’ claim that the statute should be read to mean “a person to whom a dwelling unit is rented subsequent to the effective date but prior to the closing date” because the emphasized words do not appear in the statute. Instead, we believe that a proper construction of the statute must be based upon an understanding of the protection that the Legislature intended to provide. It is a familiar principle that in construing a statute a court “should consider the mischief sought to be remedied * * * and * * * should construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 95; see, e.g., T.D. v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 228 AD2d 95, 106; Lincoln First Bank v Rupert, 60 AD2d 193, 197).