Turning to the cross appeal, while we cannot say that it would have been an abuse of discretion had the trial court entertained the tenant’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages, neither can we say that it was an abuse of discretion for it not to. These damages are sought pursuant to Real Property Law § 223-b entitling a tenant to money damages and/or equitable relief when a landlord institutes eviction proceedings in retaliation for the tenant’s efforts to secure rights under a lease. Retaliation was pleaded by the tenant in her answer to the landlord’s eviction proceeding, action No. 2, but only as a defense, not a counterclaim, and neither damages, compensatory or punitive, nor equitable relief was specifically demanded. Although, as the trial court noted, "[t]he main parts” of this landlord-tenant dispute were decided by a jury, the trial court, in its decision of April 8, 1986, handed down one day after the jury came in with its verdict, nevertheless undertook to adjudicate the quéstion of whether action No. 2 was retaliatory, and decided that it was, why the trial court thought it necessary to do so is not clear, since, it seems, all of the relief granted in the ensuing judgment of May 19, 1986 could have been granted without such an adjudication, solely on the basis of the jury’s verdict. Certainly, there is nothing in the trial court’s decision to indicate that a finding of retaliation was a necessary predicate to the injunctive relief granted in that judgment. Indeed, aside from the effect we give it now as a buttress for the award of a fee on a fee, the finding of retaliation was, at the time it was made, seemingly without consequence except as it might be given res judicata effect in a subsequent action for damages.