Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)

Citation: Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
Parent Document: Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
Jurisdiction: New York (state)
Effective Date: 1993-12-07
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6103695/brusco-v-braun/ ↗

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Respondents, in their brief, urge that provisions governing default judgments entered in a plenary action brought in Civil Court (CCA 1402; Uniform Rules for Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 208.32 [b]; § 208.14 [b] [1]) afford discretion pursuant to CPLR 3215 (e) (now subd [f]) to direct a plaintiff to give oral testimony before rendering judgment. Therefore, by analogy, they argue that such discretion should extend to the summary proceeding in question. However, this argument overlooks the obvious fact that, in enacting RPAPL article 7, the Legislature provided a comprehensive procedural statute governing, exclu*34sively, summary proceedings for the recovery of possession of real property. Had the Legislature intended that these proceedings be subject to the rules governing other actions, it would not have found it necessary to draft a separate statute. What might be proper in other types of proceedings is immaterial, if not irrelevant, to one brought pursuant to the unique provisions of RPAPL 732, applicable only to nonpayment proceedings (see, Hanover Estates v Finkelstein, 194 Misc 755, 758-760).

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