From this testimony the learned referee was justified in his find: ings that these rear tenement houses were unfit for habitation. But the testimony was far from establishing that they were not capable of being made fit for habitation, or that the nuisance upon them could not be abated in any other way than by their destruction. It was quite clear from the testimony that the unsanitary condition of the. buildings was caused, to a very considerable extent, if not entirely, by the filthy habits of the persons who inhabited them, and grew out of the fact that they were'used for human habitation. It did not appear that, after the buildings had been vacated, they might not easily have been put into a sanitary condition by proper repairs and the removal of those offensive appurtenances which were more particularly complained of as the cause of their unhealthy condition.
Even if it be said, however, from this testimony, that the referee would have been justified in finding that the buildings could not have been made fit for human habitation, still, the necessity for their destruction was not made to appear, A thing is a nuisance when, because of its inherent qualities or the use to which it is "put, it. works an injury to people wli„b live in its neighborhood. The right to abate it arises from the necessity of the case, exists only because of that necessity, and is to be exercised only so far as the necessity requires. A thing which is a nuisance because of the use to which it is put cannot be destroyed by way of abating the nuisance unless such destruction is necessary. If the nuisance can be abated by discontinuing the use it must be abated in that way. (Wood Nuis. § 33; Ely v. Supervisors of Niagara County, 36 N. Y. 297.) The case of Meeker v. Van Rensselaer (15 Wend. 397),