To this end, defendants advance various excuses for their delay that, in sum and substance, are predicated on Hommel's lack of legal experience, which led him to physically appear at the courthouse on the date that an answer was due rather than serving a written answer on plaintiff's counsel. However, Hommel's ignorance of his legal obligations based upon his decision to initially proceed pro se, when considered alongside his representation that he had initially deemed the complaint frivolous, does not constitute a reasonable excuse for his delay in answering (see Carrington Mtge. Servs., LLC v Fiore, 206 AD3d at 1307; Kelly v Hinkley, 186 AD3d 1842, 1843 [3d Dept 2020]; Kranenburg v Butwell, 34 AD3d 1005, 1006 [3d Dept 2006]; compare Puchner v Nastke, 91 AD3d 1261, 1262 [3d Dept 2012]). Moreover, based upon their undisputed receipt of two separate correspondence from plaintiff's counsel, the second of which Hommel disregarded entirely, defendants were clearly on notice that litigation would be commenced if they failed to respond, and the summons provided a further warning that the failure to answer the complaint could result in a default judgment (see OneWest Bank, FSB v Villafana, 187 AD3d 1201, 1202 [2d Dept 2020]; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Daniels, 180 AD3d 738, 739 [2d Dept 2020]; Chase Home Fin., LLC v Minott, 115 AD3d 634, 634 [2d Dept 2014]). Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that Supreme Court did not clearly abuse its discretion in determining that defendants lacked a reasonable excuse for defaulting and, accordingly, we need not address whether defendants have established a meritorious defense (see Matter of CCAP Auto Lease Ltd. v Savannah Car Care, Inc., 211 AD3d at 1214; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Oppitz, 182 AD3d 746, 747 [3d Dept 2020], lv dismissed 35 NY3d 1126 [2020]).