identifiable class. For a statute to create such private rights, its text must be phrased
in terms of the persons benefited.
536 U.S. at 283-284 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The
Court did distinguish cases brought under § 1983 from cases brought directly under the right-
conferring statute by stating:
Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of showing an intent to create
a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of
rights secured by federal statutes. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers
an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.
Id. at 284 (internal citation omitted).
Accordingly, when Sandoval and Gonzaga are read together, it becomes clear that in order
for Caswell to bring a viable claim under § 1983, he must show that the right, of which he seeks
vindication, is conferred by Congress in “clear and unambiguous terms.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290;
id. at 286 (“[W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends
to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under
an implied right of action.”). Furthermore, the right conferred must be “phrased in terms of the
persons benefited.” Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Statutes that focus on the person
regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on
a particular class of persons.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court made clear in Gonzaga that where a statute simply prohibits certain conduct, or sets forth a
policy, that statute does not create a cause of action or other rights for the individual protected by
the statute. See 536 U.S. at 287-288.
Here, Caswell claims that DHC violated 24 C.F.R. § 982.311(b) when it improperly
terminated him from the Voucher Program. In supplemental briefing to this Court, Caswell argued
that his right to be free from termination in this manner stems from 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2). Section
1437f(o) of the Housing Act establishes the Voucher Program. Subsection 2 of § 1437f(o) is entitled
“Amount of monthly assistance payment,” and begins: “Subject to the requirement under section
1437a(a)(3) of this title (relating to minimum rental amount), the monthly assistance payment for
a family receiving assistance under this subsection shall be determined as follows . . . .” The
provision then sets forth the varying amounts of tenant-based assistance that participants of the
Voucher Program should receive. Caswell contends that this provision confers a right to tenants
because it is analogous to the rent-ceiling provision of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437a, which
the Supreme Court previously recognized as conferring upon tenants the right not to be overbilled.
See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-430 (1987). In
Wright, the PHA overbilled tenants for their utilities, thereby directly violating the statutory rent
ceiling provision of the Housing Act. Accordingly, the Court found that the tenants could sue the
PHA via § 1983 for this federal rights violation. Id.
Even if § 1437f(o)(2) could be viewed as being phrased in terms of the persons “benefited,”
that is beside the point in our case. Section 1437f(o)(2) establishes the amount of monthly
assistance that a tenant should receive if he is a participant of the program. Here, Caswell claims
that DHC improperly terminated his participation in the Voucher Program altogether, not that DHC
violated the monthly assistance amounts set forth in the statute. Therefore, even if § 1437f(o)(2)
conferred a right to a fixed amount of subsidies, the right Caswell claims to have been
violated—under 24 C.F.R. § 982.311(b)—has nothing to do with the amount of his subsidy.
Moreover, we can find no provision under 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et. seq. which, in clear and
unambiguous terms, confers a particular right upon the tenant to subsidies after the landlord initiates
eviction proceedings. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7) establishes certain obligations of the
No. 04-1540 Caswell v. City of Detroit Housing Comm’n, et al. Page 5