Grier v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 418 U.S. App. D.C. 185 (2015)

Citation: Grier v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 418 U.S. App. D.C. 185 (2015)
Parent Document: Grier v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 418 U.S. App. D.C. 185 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-07-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2816866/grier-v-united-states-departmen... ↗

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We do not find HUD’s argument persuasive. First, we do
not consider Kelly helpful. In that case, the statute specifically
referred to the date of the order as the date for commencing the
filing-of-an-appeal time limit. Here, the statute refers only to
the “entry” of the order. The order date and the day entry of the
order is made may be one and the same, but not necessarily.
Second, HUD’s contention that “entry” occurs when the order
is signed is untenable as it would permit an agency to shorten a
would-be petitioner’s review period by delaying service of a
signed order. Instead, we find helpful our holding in Energy
Probe. In that case the relevant document was signed on a
certain date and stamped “served.” 872 F.2d at 437. As noted
above, we held that under the Hobbs Act the date of “entry” “is
the date on which the agency’s final decision is signed and
served.” Id. at 438. In the present case, the agency’s final
decision was not “signed and served” until the certificate of
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