Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Elizabeth Marshall v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 497 F.2d 643 (1973)

Citation
Elizabeth Marshall v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 497 F.2d 643 (1973)
Parent Document
Elizabeth Marshall v. James Lynn, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 497 F.2d 643 (1973)
Effective Date
1973-12-20

Other Sections in This Document (49)

Full Text

1,505 chars
how the program prior to the adoption of BMIR actually operated. The mere fact of administrative scrutiny of rents is not inconsistent with a predominant role for market forces, as appears from our decision today in Tenants’ Council of Tiber Island v. Lynn. The legislative history of the 1961 amendments implies that rents in § 221(d)(3) housing had predominantly reflected market changes, at least as to the important factor of rate of mortgage interest. The resulting inability of the families which Congress desired to protect to purchase adequate housing led to the adoption of the BMIR subsidy. Thus, in 1961 Congress focused on the BMIR program as the mechanism to aid families unable to purchase housing at market rents, and specifically tied that program to a mortgagor’s submission to rent controls, applied for the benefit of tenants. We do- not discern a similar protection in the form of continuing regulation of rents in behalf of ténants in housing financed under § 221(d)(3) but without the BMIR subsidy. Hence we conclude that the constitutional or statutory claims of those tenants that they are entitled to be heard before rents are increased are without merit. While the absence of rent control in such housing may mean that some tenants will find it difficult to meet rental payments, that hardship is insufficient, without a more specific statutory basis, to invoke a judicial remedy under the Constitution. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972).