Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891 (1996)

Citation: Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891 (1996)
Parent Document: Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891 (1996)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1996-08-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/723804/jankowski-lee-associates-v-cisneros/ ↗

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Significantly, the court consistently refers to "Rusinov's MS." Although MS may result in a disability, it is not in itself a disability or handicap. It is a disease. The disease becomes a handicap when it causes "physical or mental impairment which significantly limits one or more of [a] person's major life activities." MS is an individualized disease, ranging from benign (very slight symptoms and limitations) to severe (total incapacity). See Carter v. Casa Central, 849 F.2d 1048, 1050 n. 1 (7th Cir.1988) (describing disabilities that might arise from MS).1 Documentation and testimony at hearings before the ALJ disclosed that Rusinov's MS was somewhere in the middle range. But he was able to disguise or hide the outward symptoms; he felt he was "treated with less respect and credibility once other people [saw] him as disabled." The court states that "it is clear that Rusinov's MS is a handicap within the meaning of the FHA." Ante at 895. But that became clear only after a two-day hearing before the ALJ. He did not appear disabled to the management of RPA on the occasions they observed him between 1986 and 1992. Indeed, the ALJ determined that Ms. Sellin did not know that Rusinov's MS affected his mobility. (ALJ p. 10 para. 32)

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