No warrant was issued in the dispossess proceedings but the removal of the tenants after the issuance and service of the precept therein, whereby the landlord was enabled to take peaceful possession of the premises, canceled and annulled the lease, except as the landlord had by a proper survivorship clause reserved the option to keep it ahve for the purpose of reletting and holding the tenants for the deficiency. (Cornwell v. Sanford, 222 N. Y. 248; Hoffman Brewing Co. v. Wuttge, 234 N. Y. 469; Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N. Y. 167.)
It has been held that the word “ re-enter,” as used in a lease reserving to the lessors the right of re-entry upon default in payment of rent merely, does not, for reasons rooted in the feudal law, cover the removal of the lessee by statutory summary proceedings whereby the lease is terminated (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1434; Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381), but applies only to such re-entries as do not put an end to the lease, as, e. g., when the premises become vacant before dispossess proceedings are begun. (Kottler v. N. Y. Bargain House, Inc., supra.)
The lease may, however, contain a provision making the deposit security for damages after dispossess proceedings. (Lenco, Inc., v. Hirschfeld, 247 N. Y. 44.) In Baylies v. Ingram (84 App. Div. 360; affd., 181 N. Y. 518) it was held that the words the lessor “ shall have the right to enter the said premises, either by process of law or otherwise,”- in case of non-payment of rent or default “ in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained,” survived the ejection of the lessee by summary proceedings. In Anzolone v. Paskusz (96 App. Div. 188) the words were, as in the lease now before us, “ re-enter the same [premises] either by force or otherwise.” The court said: