Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)

Citation: Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)
Parent Document: Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1969-02-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/107814/thorpe-v-housing-authority-of-durham/ ↗

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Finding that the circular was intended to be mandatory does not, of course, determine the validity of the requirements it imposes.25 In our opinion remanding this case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina to consider the HUD circular’s applicability, we pointed out that the circular was issued pursuant to HUD’s rule-making power under § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937,26 which authorizes HUD 27 “from time to time [to] make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.” 28 The Housing Authority argues that this authorization is limited by the Act’s express policy of “vest[ing] in the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent housing program, including responsibility for the establishment of rents and eligibility requirements (subject to the approval of . . . [HUD]), with due consideration to accomplishing the objectives of this Act while effecting economies.”29 But the HUD circular is not inconsistent with this policy. Its minimal effect upon *278the Authority’s “responsibility in the administration” of McDougald Terrace is aptly attested to by the Authority’s own description of what the circular does not require:

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