Another proposition invoked on the appeal is that, as defendant remained in possession until March, or three months after plaintiff had declared a forfeiture, and paid the same rent during said period he had before, instead of paying double rent as the contract provided he should if be remained in possession, the declaration of forfeiture was nullified and the original *265term reinstated. In answer to this argument it is contended for defendant, the term absolutely ended with plaintiff’s declaration, and no subsequent act of the parties, except a new contract of lease, would restore the term or renew the relation of landlord and tenant. We are unwilling to decide, and it is unnecessary for us to decide, that an agreement restoring the old term could not be implied by law from conduct of the lessor and lessee subsequent to a declaration of forfeiture, which indicated an intention to disregard the declaration and continue the lease in existence.' Likely long performance of the terms of a lease by both parties, subsequent to a declaration, would be treated as having reinstated the term and suffice to preclude either party from taking advantage of the declaration. In the present instance the court was not asked to declare any law on the propositions involved’; and, hence, on whatever issue the evidence conflicts, it is to" be presumed the finding of fact was for the defendant, who prevailed below. Substantial testimony appears in the record to prove defendant considered himself bound for double rent after he was notified plaintiff had elected to forfeit the term, and that he so stated to the plaintiff, excusing himself from paying until an indebtedness he claimed to hold against plaintiff was adjusted. There is testimony, too, to show defendant vacated the premises as soon as he could procure another building, and that he was on the hunt for one from the date he was served with notice to vacate. On such evidence, it cannot be said the only fair finding was that both parties elected to ignore the declaration of forfeiture and go on with the term. On the point in hand this case bears some resemblance to Walker v. Engler, 30 Mo. 130, which involved a lease containing a clause for the payment of double rent for the time the tenant remained in possession of the premises after forfeiture. The stipulation was treated by the Supreme Court as *266one for liquidated damages, which the lessor became entitled to receive from the date when he exercised his option to determine a forfeiture, until the lessee vacated. It is fair to presume the present defendant preferred to submit to the penalty of double rent for a few months, rather than move his machinery out of plaintiff’s building until, he had procured another building wherein to shelter it. Of course plaintiff might have turned him out sooner by an unlawful detainer action; but this was not done and it would be improper for a court of review to hold, on the facts in proof, there was no room for any finding except that the parties elected to treat the original term as intact. The judgment is affirmed. All concur.