But though such be the rule as to an actual eviction, another prevails when the eviction is by construction of law, for to complete such an eviction, it is-essential that the premises shall be abandoned by the lessee. In every case of constructive eviction, in order to render the eviction available to the end of defeating the entire rent, it must appear that the lessee abandoned the premises for that cause. As to such eviction, the rule is thus stated in 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 479: “It is well settled, as a general rule, that there can be no constructive eviction unless the tenant abandons the premises on account of the acts or circumstances claimed to operate as an eviction.” Mr. McAdam thus states the law as to a constructive eviction: “Where the eviction is constructive merely, it is no eviction in law unless followed by a complete abandonment of possession by the tenant.” [See 2 McAdam, Landlord & Tenant (4 Ed.), p. 1385.] The law is thus declared, too, as we understand it, by our Supreme Court in Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209, for upon a close scrutiny of that case it will appear that the instructions declaring the rule of decision at the trial, which were approved on appeal, required the jury to find that the defendant abandoned the premises and offered to surrender possession to plaintiff .lessor. That case was one of constructive evic-, *672tion. It appeared that Eddy occupied a storeroom in St. Louis, as the lessee of Jackson. The covenant in the lease there involved required the lessee to make repairs, but this is immaterial, for the case was ruled as though a positive encroachment on the part of the lessor appeared against the lessee’s estate. The lessor occupied the room, as a grocery store, immediately above that of the lessee’s establishment, and it appears the lessor permitted the dripping of salt, tar, etc., from the store occupied by him above, upon the goods in the store of the lessee below. Because of this, Eddy, the lessee, removed from the premises, abandoned the same, and delivered the keys at the lessor’s establishment. The lessor returned the keys to the lessee and refused to accept possession of the premises. Thereafter, Eddy, the lessee, placed a sign thereon as for rent, with directions to apply to Eddy. It was argued that a complete abandonment of the premises did not appear, because Eddy retained the keys and advertised the premises for rent, but the Supreme Court declared the question to be one of fact for the jury. Touching this matter, the court said: “In this case, the court by its instruction submitted the question to the jury to find whether, by the conduct or acts of the plaintiff, the storeroom occupied by defendant was rendered unfit for use as a store, and that, in consequence thereof the defendant had surrendered the possession. ■ The jury having found these facts, their verdict was properly given for defendant.” The rule of law stated in the opinion and to be deduced from that case clearly requires an abandonment of the premises in order to render the constructive eviction available, and the judgment was affirmed on the ground that it appeared that, though Eddy retained the keys after they were refused by the lessor and placed a sign on the premises for rent, he had nevertheless abandoned and surrendered the premises to the lessor, for he could not do *673more than move out and surrender the keys to the lessor, which he did, though the keys were not retained by him. A case much resembling Jackson v. Eddy is Burnham v. Martin, decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois. [See 90 Ill. 438.] There, a constructive eviction appeared and the lessee abandoned the premises but retained constructive possession through keeping the keys. It does not appear in that case that he returned the keys to the lessor, or offered to do so, as in the case of Jackson v. Eddy, supra, and retained them after the refusal of the lessor to accept them, but it does appear that the lessee removed from the premises and retained the keys in his possession thereafter. Upon defending against the rent as for a constructive eviction, the Supreme Court rejected the defense as a valid one, for the reason the tenant retained constructive possession of the premises through keeping the keys of the house without offering them to the lessor. The court said: “The tenant, before he can defend against the recovery of rent, must abandon the premises, and not retain either the actual or constructive possession of them.” We, therefore, conclude that the court erred in directing the jury that it was immaterial that Ur. Johnson, defendant’s sub-lessee, continued to occupy the second and third stories of the building throughout the term of the lease, for clearly, in order to be acquitted from the whole rent, the law devolved the duty on the lessee to completely abandon the whole premises.