In a previous case we declined to attempt to frame a rule of general application by which to determine what amounts to the constructive eviction of a tenant. [Delmar Inv. Co. v. Blumenfeld, 118 Mo. App. 308, 94 S. W. 823.] The decisions dealing with the subject are cautious about stating broadly when an eviction may occur in consequence of acts of a landlord not amounting to actual expulsion of the teuant from the leasehold premises, but we do not hesitate to say that nothing resembling a constructive eviction was established by the evidence in the present case. Disorderly conduct and language *161in the cafe or clubrooms, remote from defendant’s apartment, were proved. She was not personally annoyed by these incidents, except insofar as they tended to affect the reputation of the building, compromise her or interfere with her vocation of music teacher. But, as already stated, the building was prepared for the occupancy of various tenants and for a cafe and the sale of liquors therein. These facts the defendant knew when she leased her apartments, or, if she did not know them, then, she did soon afterwards and submitted to them. It is true the testimony tends to prove there was no noticeably bad conduct in the cafe until during the summer of 1905 and subsequently. But plaintiff continued to occupy her apartment long after that time and until the middle of January, 1906. She made no complaint about the disorderly conduct in the club or cafe or any demand of the- plaintiff that it be restrained. Two months before she vacated, she ordered her apartments to be papered and this was done at her request. This act indicated no dissatisfaction with what was1 going on in the building or intention to quit her apartments. Moreover, it was not shown the plaintiff even rented the basement, or a portion of it, for cafe purposes. The record suggests that the basement was occupied for those purposes before he became the owner of the building. It is obvious that a cafe or club may be conducted without drunkenness, bad language, boisterousness, or other disorderly behavior. Hence the giving of a lease for a club or cafe would not imply that the landlord intended to authorize the use of the premises for disgraceful or immoral purposes. That plaintiff was in any way responsible for disorder on the premises, there was no proof. A constructive eviction from a leasehold cannot be claimed by a tenant because of the acts of another tenant of a portion of the premises, unless the landlord is responsible for what the tenant does. And the landlord ought not *162to be held responsible to the extent of permitting a tenant to vacate during his term, when no complaint was made by the vacating tenant and it does not appear that the landlord authorized or consented to the wrongful acts of the other tenant, or that the lease to the latter was for a purpose which was necessarily immoral, illegal, or a nuisance. [Gilhooley v. Washington, 4 N. Y. 217; Cougle v. Densmore, 57 Ill. App. 591; Lay v. Bennett, 4 Colo. App. 252; Seaboard Realty Co. v. Fuller, 67 N. Y. Supp. 146; 11 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 471.] In view of the undisputed evidence that defendant remained in the premises without complaint for months, while the alleged disorder in the club was going on, and the signal failure to connect the plaintiff in any responsible way with what happened there, it is manifest there is no defense to plaintiff’s action for rent. Were it necessary to the decision of the case, we would be compelled to discuss the principles of well-considered opinions cited below, in which conduct of far more annoying and immoral character than that of which the defendant complains, was held to constitute no constructive eviction, as the acts complained of were committed by other tenants or strangers and not by the landlord. [Cougle v. Densmore and Gilhooly v. Washington, supra; Histler v. Wilson, 77 Ill. App. 149; Bristol Hotel Co. v. Pegrain, 98 N. Y. Supp. 512; Gray v. Gaff, 8 Mo. App. 329.] The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. All concur.