Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Citation
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Parent Document
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Jurisdiction
- Missouri (state)
- Effective Date
- 1979-03-21
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1567388/bryan-v-vaughn/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (35)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
- Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d 177 (1979)
Full Text
1,692 charsAlso argued by plaintiffs under their third point is the contention that they were entitled to liquidated damages as set forth in the lease agreement. By way of response to this contention, we will set out the pertinent part of the lease: “Provided, however, that upon taking possession hereunder, the Lessors may at their election terminate and end this lease or may relet said property, and the Lessees shall be liable for the difference in the rental for the balance of the term, or if the Lessors do not relet but operate the property themselves, then and in that event the Lessors shall be liable for three additional months’ rent from the time of retaking possession, to be paid as and for liquidated damages.” (Emphasis ours). Even were we to find, without suggestion from either party, that the underlined word was included in the agreement by mistake, and on our own motion change the lease to read “Lessees” in place of the emphasized word “Lessors”, still it would not aid the plaintiffs. Under the lease, plaintiffs as Lessors could, at their election, terminate the lease upon default by defendants in the payment of rent. At the time the backhoe was placed in the motel driveway, and when defendants were relieved of any further obligation under the lease upon their abandonment of the property the next day, plaintiffs had not elected to end the lease. In short, the lease was not terminated by defendants’ failure to tender all the rent due on September 1, nor by election and notice thereof by plaintiffs. Instead, the lease ended by the wrongful act of plaintiffs, constituting an eviction, and in such circumstances plaintiffs are in no wise entitled to liquidated damages.