In the Matter of the Department of Buildings of the City of New York, Respondent; Philco Realty Corp. et al., Appellants.
Argued March 24, 1964;
decided June 4, 1964.
Harry Krauss for appellants.
I. The order was improvidently granted, as there were no dangerous conditions and the premises were vacant. Hence, the order was confiscatory, unconstitutional and a violation of appellants’ property rights. (Central Sav. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N. Y. 266; Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188; People v. Alaboda, 198 App. Div. 41; Matter of 340 East 57th St. Corp. v. Weaver, 3 Misc 2d 356, 2 A D 2d 678.) II. The order was granted without due process of law. (Interchemical Corp. v. Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224; City of Buffalo v. Hawks, 226 App. Div. 480; United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Frelinghuysen, 262 App. Div. 259; Kennell v. Rider, 225 App. Div. 391; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Fire Assn. of Phila. v. Oneida County Macaroni Co., 294 F. 633; People v. Richetti, 302 N. Y. 290.) III. The law is basically unconstitutional in that it impairs the rights of the mortgagee under his mortgage contract. (Argall v. Pitts, 78 N. Y. 239; Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 263 N. Y. 148.) IV. Due process and the interests of justice require a proper trial, from which should be excluded gratuitous statements by noninterested persons. (Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 181 Misc. 78.)
Leo A. Larkin, Corporation Counsel (Robert E. Hugh, John F. Kelly and John A. Murray of counsel), for respondent.