Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165 (1985)

Citation: Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165 (1985)
Parent Document: Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165 (1985)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1985-04-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2317325/administrator-of-veterans-affai... ↗

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These definitions cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the statute. Whether one party is entitled to the possession of a rental unit or whether another party is entitled to receive rent for the use of that unit depends on other provisions of D.C. law, including § 45-1561. That this must be so may be seen by considering the position of a tenant whose lease has expired and whose landlord has served notice to vacate. In the absence of a provision such as § 45-1561, the tenant would not be entitled to the continued possession of the apartment, nor would the landlord be entitled to rent for the period following expiration of the notice to vacate.7 Yet there can be no doubt that § 45-1561 prohibits the landlord from evicting a tenant in such a situation. The statute plainly states: “Except as provided in this section, no tenant shall be evicted from a rental unit, notwithstanding the expiration of his or her lease or rental agreement, so long as he or she continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled for such rental unit.” Id. § 45-1561(a) (emphasis added). The obvious import of this language led us to declare an owner’s attempt to evict a tenant based on the expiration of the lease a “prima facie violation” of a prior regulation containing essentially this same provision. Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc. v. Gassaway, 353 A.2d 288, 290 n. 5 (D.C.1976).8

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