Park v. Brahmbhatt (2020)

Citation: Park v. Brahmbhatt (2020)
Parent Document: Park v. Brahmbhatt (2020)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2020-08-13
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4774864/park-v-brahmbhatt/ ↗

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          Ms. Park asks, in the alternative, that we reverse because the trial judge
ruled on the motion to dismiss more than two months after the case had been
reassigned to another judge. The trial judge, according to Ms. Park, acted in
violation of Civil Rule 40-I(c), which states, “[a]ll proceedings in a case after its
assignment, including trial, will be scheduled and conducted by the assigned
judge.” But Ms. Park did not raise this argument to the trial judge who ruled on
the motion. We therefore deem her argument waived. See George Washington
Univ. v. Violand, 940 A.2d 965, 970 (D.C. 2008) (“Here, by not asserting the
statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its pretrial statement (or even in
its motion for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment), GWU waived
or abandoned that affirmative defense.” (emphasis added)).
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          Because of our disposition in this case, we do not address other grounds
of affirmance advanced by Mr. Hansen and Mr. Brahmbhatt.

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