"[At some point between June 24, 2010 and September 2010] one or more of the Individual Defendants falsely and maliciously stated to Hatkoff that Fletcher had 'checked out of his business' and was living on 'borrowed money' . . .
"On September 14, 2010, . . . the Board sent a letter to certain Dakota shareholders . . . [It stated, inter alia,] '[b]ased on the financial information submitted by Fletcher, the Board concluded that approving such a purchase would not be in the best interest of The Dakota' . . . [The letter] also contained the false and misleading statement that Fletcher had declined the Board's request to provide additional financial information."
While some of these allegations do not specify exactly which of the defendants made a particular statement, that is not a fatal defect (see Torres v Prime Realty Servs., 7 AD3d 343, 344 [2004]; see also Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 214 AD2d 250, 260 [1995]).
Defendants further contend that the above-quoted statements are covered by a qualified privilege and that the complaint fails to allege malice sufficient to defeat the privilege (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 437 [1992]). Contrary to the latter contention, the complaint alleges malice. But, in any event, we would not "give conclusive effect to defendants' position of qualified privilege before any affirmative defense to that{**99 AD3d at 56} effect was raised in a responsive pleading" (see Acosta v Vataj, 170 AD2d 348, 348-349 [1991]). Thus, we decline to dismiss as against the Dakota the fifth cause of action and so much of the first cause of action as it is based on allegations of defamation to the extent they do not rely on statements contained in affidavits.