There are cases in our jurisdiction in which the questions of a bar by a former judgment in a similar proceeding was raised, but the facts distinguish them. In Johnson v. Gordon (Ky.) 118 S. W. 372, the defendant relied on a judgment of acquittal of forcible entry in bar of a forcible detainer proceeding, but his contention was not allowed, since forcible entry had no relevancy to forcible detention after the defendant had been legally required to surrender the possession of property. In Pulliam v. Sells, 124 Ky. 310, 99 S. W. 289, the lease was from month to month, and a former judgment in a forcible detainer proceeding did not preclude'the giving of another notice for any subsequent month to vacate the tenancy and action thereon. Both of those cases cite as authority Shepherd v. Thompson, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 176, in which it was held that acquittal of a charge of forcibly detaining the demised premises was no bar to a similar warrant for a detainer committed at a subsequent time. There is no variance between the principles of those cases and that applicable to the instant case, where the right to recover or to retain possession rests on the same contract and the same alleged breach litigated in the former proceeding. That proceeding involved and necessarily determined on its merits the same issue sought to be determined in this case. Hence the question is res judicata. Marcum v. Edwards, 181 Ky. 683, 205 S. W. 798. So deeply implanted is this principle in our jurisprudence that the Supreme Court in Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 How. (U.S.) 352 declared: “The res judicata renders white that *387