2018 NY Slip Op 51958

Citation: 2018 NY Slip Op 51958
Jurisdiction: New York (state)
Source verification: cross_accepted_sealed
Original Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_51958.htm ↗

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permit occupancy by the tenant or tenants and their immediate family, and by one more occupant
and that occupant's [*23]dependent children, provided that the
tenant or the tenant's spouse occupies the premises as his or her primary residence. Real Property
Law § 235-f (3). A tenant under the statute is defined as one who is entitled to occupy the
residential premises and is a party to the lease or rental agreement. Id., subsection 1. Any
"lease or rental agreement purporting to waive a provision of [Real Property Law § 235-f ]
is null and void." Real Property Law § 235-f did not restrict or expand tenant occupancy
rights but instead only "limited the ability of landlords to restrict them." Real Property Law
§ 235-f, Rudolph de Winter and Larry Loeb, Practice Commentaries at 413, McKinney's
Cons Laws of NY, Book 49 (2006) ; see also Capital Holding Co. v Stavrolakes, 242
AD2d 240, 243-244 (1st Dept 1997), affd 92 NY2d 1009 (1998). Real Property Law
§ 235-f applies to proprietary leases. Mitchell Gardens No. 1 Coop, Corp. v Cataldo,
175 Misc 2d 493, 495 (App Term, 2d Dept 1997); Southridge Coop. Section No. 3 v
Menendez, 141 Misc 2d 823, 828 (App Term, 2d Dept 1988); see also Lenox Hill Hosp. v 305/72 Owners
Corp., 90 AD3d 470, 471 (1st Dept 2011) (proprietary lease's occupancy provision was
consistent with Real Property Law § 235-f [2]); see generally Richard Siegler,
Development of the Roommate Law, NY Law Journal, July 5, 1989 at 3.

Plaintiffs' reliance on Real Property Law § 235-f is unavailing, as are plaintiffs' claims
that the occupancy agreement is null and void and/or against public policy. Even if Blumenfeld
were a tenant within the meaning of the statute, which is questionable since the amended 2017