Further, it is evident from the statutory text, the case law and the language of the GCEL Notice itself that it was intended to apply to proceedings such as the instant one as the GCEL Notice incorporates a section regarding a nuisance holdover based upon the substantial breach of the tenancy obligation. See, Id. at 661. See also, GCEL Notice at [4] [F].
In opposition, Petitioner relies solely on Latchmin & Singh Realty LLC v. Singh, 87 Misc 3d 1234(A), 242 N.Y.S.3d 919 (NY Civ. Ct. 2025), which set forth that the GCEL statute must be read strictly, and consequently, because the notice of termination here was sent pursuant to 9 NYCRR2524.2(c), the statute does not require service of the GCEL Notice.
However, Latchmin specifically analyzed whether the GCEL Notice was required in cases where no landlord/tenant relationship exists. The Court found that it was not.
Notably, as part of the Court's analysis, it opined that "If the legislature intended for the [*3]GCEL notice be appended/incorporated in situations, such as this, where petitioner is not a landlord and respondent is not a tenant, then the GCEL notice would have had somewhere for the petitioner to note such exemption as RPL § 215 indicates that good cause is only required where a landlord is attempting to remove a tenant from a covered housing accommodation. This supports the determination in Muscat that a GCEL notice is not required when there is no landlord/tenant relationship between the parties." Latchmin & Singh Realty LLC v. Singh, 87 Misc 3d 1234(A), 242 N.Y.S.3d 919 (NY Civ. Ct. 2025).