48 US at 64, 67 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The Court recognized that antidiscrimination statutes "depend[ ] for [their] enforcement upon the cooperation of [those] who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses" and interpreting antiretaliation provisions "to provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment" of their "primary objective depends" (id. at 67; see Crawford v Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 555 US 271, 279 [2009]).
[1] Neither party disputes that Burlington provides the appropriate standard for assessing adverse action under the Human Rights Law. Applying that test, the Appellate Division erred by concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Pine Ridge and Pentkowski took adverse action against CityVision and Renner based on the initial complaint. We reject the notion that the letter could not amount to adverse action as a matter of law. Instead, determining whether a threat of litigation amounts to adverse action is properly left to a fact-specific determination (see e.g. Hollandale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v Bonesteel, 173 AD3d 55, 69 [3d Dept 2019] [eviction threats "may constitute adverse actions . . . , even when the eviction is never carried out"]; cf. Moran v Simpson, 80 Misc 2d 437, 438 [Sup Ct, Livingston County 1974] [concluding that the commencement of a libel lawsuit in response to a complaint under the Human Rights Law was an adverse action]). A per se rule precluding litigation threats from constituting adverse action would impermissibly restrict New York's antiretaliation statute (see Executive Law § 296 [7]) in violation of the legislative directive to construe the Human Rights Law liberally to eliminate discrimination in this state (see id. §