Petitioner offered a new lease to respondent. This much is clear because petitioner's affidavit does not dispute that there was an offer, but rather points to the fact that the offer was not signed. Petitioner's argument is that there is no binding contract because respondent has not signed the lease offer (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 18 ¶ 2).
While that may be so, the offer alone was sufficient to vitiate the predicate notice. Respondent avers that she was "surprised" to learn that, after receiving a new lease offer, petitioner still wanted to maintain the instant eviction proceeding (NYSCEF Doc No. 9 ¶ 6).
[1] Since the lease offer would cause a reasonable person to doubt the finality of the notice of termination, and in fact the offer caused respondent to doubt the notice's finality, the notice of termination is a nullity. Thus, respondent's motion for summary judgment is granted on this basis.{**81 Misc 3d at 222}[*4]
b. Was the failure to notify HPD a fatal defect?
[2] Although this court need not reach the merits of respondent's other arguments, the court finds that even if the lease offer had been insufficient to vitiate the predicate notice, respondent would still be entitled to summary judgment.
Petitioner admits to having failed to notify HPD of the instant preceding.
Contrary to petitioner's affidavit (NYSCEF Doc No. 18 ¶ 1), HPD needs to be notified of an eviction proceeding.
Service on a Section 8 administrator is an essential element of petitioner's prima facie case (433 W. Assoc. v Murdock, 276 AD2d 360 [1st Dept 2000]). This is true whether the administrator is NYCHA, HPD, DHCR, CVR or any other public housing authority or administrator.