prevail." In our view, this approach improperly shifted the burden to petitioners to prove, in the
first instance, that CityVision did not hold a reasonable belief that Pine Ridge was engaging in
housing discrimination (see Matter of
Rambert v Fischer, 128 AD3d 1111, 1112 [2015]; Matter of Delaware County Dept.
of Social Servs. v Brooker, 272 AD2d 835, 836 [2000]). While typically such an error would
result in remittal for further proceedings, for the following reason remittal is not warranted but,
rather, the retaliation complaint must be dismissed.
The hearing evidence failed to support the finding that petitioners took adverse action against
CityVision, under the third prong of the test for retaliation. "[A]n adverse action must have some
materially adverse effect on the complainant and must be of sufficient magnitude to permit a
finding of intimidation, coercion, threats or interference" (Hollandale Apts. & Health
Club, LLC v Bonesteel, 173 AD3d at 69 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations
omitted]). Pentkowski's letter simply stated his view that the allegations of discrimination against
his client were false, and that Pine Ridge intended to seek compensation for the costs incurred in
defending those false allegations. There was no evidence that petitioners took any additional
actions against CityVision. We cannot conclude that, under these circumstances, the mere
sending of the letter rose to the level of retaliation. That is, there was no showing that the letter
had any "materially adverse effect" upon CityVision, nor was it "of sufficient magnitude to
permit a finding [*3]of intimidation, coercion, threats or
interference" (id.).
In light of the foregoing, we need not address petitioners' remaining contentions concerning