on a purely procedural issue that has only a minor impact,[FN1] which, in their own words, is the
"determination on the applicability of RPAPL 735 (2) (b) in the context of service of eviction
warrants under RPAPL 749 (2) (a)."
Of course, if a matter is moot, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case unless the
exception to the doctrine applies,[FN2] permitting us to review matters because they
(1) typically evade review, (2) are likely to recur and, importantly, (3) involve issues that are
novel and substantial (see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100
NY2d 801, 810-811 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]; Matter of Hearst Corp.
v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 713-715 [1980]; Matter of Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v Poole, 188
AD3d 1525, 1529 [2020]; Owner Operator Ind. Drivers Assn., Inc. v Karas, [*4]188 AD3d 1313, 1316 [2020]). All three elements must be met for
the mootness exception to apply. Therefore, although the existence of one element of the
mootness exception may be demonstrated, if the others are not also met, the exception is not
triggered or applicable (see e.g. Matter of Chenier v Richard W., 82 NY2d 830, 832
[1993]; Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d at 715).
In the case before us, we agree with the majority that the second factor, and arguably the
first,[FN3] have been met.
However, whether a county sheriff's department is required to file an affidavit of service under
these circumstances perhaps is a novel question, it is hardly substantial and, in our view, reaching
the merits here would result in the exception to the mootness doctrine swallowing the important
jurisdictional rule. Certainly, "[n]o persuasive argument has been made that the matter is of