imants vacated the property either were items of ordinary wear and tear, or if those issues went beyond{**60 Misc 3d at 848} ordinary wear and tear, the defendant did not satisfactorily (and as required by the UCCA) prove the amount and cost of repairs and/or damages and thus did not satisfactorily prove noncompliance with paragraph 1 (with its reference to leaving the property in "move-in" condition) or paragraphs 5, 6, and 7. With respect to paragraph 11, the claimants vacated the property on February 26, 2018, but paid the rent through February 28, 2018, so the claimants did not violate paragraph 11.[FN8]
Finally, with respect to that portion of paragraph 1 of the lease requiring a written 30-day notice to the defendant for the security deposit to be returned, the court finds that the defendant waived that requirement by preparing and presenting to the claimants both the "Security return" document (defendant's exhibit A) and the "Return of Security" document (defendant's exhibit B), and by releasing to Mrs. Camacho $500 of the security deposit prior to her vacating the property. Even if there were no waiver by the defendant of that portion of paragraph 1 of the lease, the court finds that portion of paragraph 1 of the lease to be contrary both to the terms of section 7-103 (1) of the General Obligations Law[FN9] and to the public policy behind the language of section 7-103 (1) of the General Obligations Law. (See Wicklund; Kamara.) The Kamara court, in no uncertain terms, made it clear that a landlord, as a trustee of any security deposit he or she receives, has an absolute duty to return the security deposit when required to do so or to account for any expenditures from it when that court stated: