lease" (Dan Klores Assoc. v Abramoff, 288 AD2d 121, 122 [1st Dept 2001]; see
Milkie, 143 AD3d at 864).
We also agree with plaintiffs that the court erred in granting the motion with respect to the
second cause of action, alleging that defendants violated Property Conservation Code of the City
of Syracuse § 27-125, inasmuch as that section gives rise to a private cause of
action. Generally, "where a statute does not explicitly provide for a private right of action, 'we
begin with the presumption that [the legislature] did not intend one' " (Jordan v Chase
Manhattan Bank, 91 F Supp 3d 491, 501 [SD NY 2015], quoting Bellikoff v Eaton Vance
Corp., 481 F3d 110, 116 [2d Cir 2007]), and the party seeking the private remedy has the
burden of establishing that one was intended (see id.). It is well settled, however, that
courts "have often found an implied right of private suit by a person aggrieved where the statute
did not specifically so provide" (Bodric v Mayfair Constr. Corp., 44 AD2d 520, 520 [1st
Dept 1974], citing United States v Post, 148 US 124 [1893]), where the "denial of a right
of private suit would be the grant of a right without a remedy" (id.). Here, we conclude
that Property Conservation Code of the City of Syracuse § 27-125, which has the
purpose of protecting the tenant's security deposit from misuse and ensuring its prompt return to
the tenant, impliedly creates a private cause of action.
We further conclude that the court erred in granting the motion with respect to plaintiffs'
third cause of action, for declaratory and injunctive relief, and fourth cause of action, for
attorney's fees, inasmuch as those causes of action are based upon allegations that defendants
violated General Obligations Law § 7-103 and Property Conservation Code of the