AD3d 599, 601 [2017]). Here, the plaintiff alleged that the damage to his unit persisted and
had not been repaired, and that such breach constituted a continuing breach of the defendants'
contractual duty to keep the building in good repair and to provide habitable premises (see Kaymakcian v Board of Mgrs. of
Charles House Condominium, 49 AD3d 407 [2008]; Measom v Greenwich & Perry St. Hous. Corp., 42 AD3d 366
[2007]; 1050 Tenants Corp. v Lapidus, 289 AD2d 145 [2001]). However, where, as here,
the sole remedy sought for the alleged continuing contractual breaches is monetary damages, the
plaintiff's recovery must be limited to damages incurred within the six years prior to
commencement of the action (see Kaymakcian v Board of Mgrs. of Charles House
Condominium, 49 AD3d at 407-408; see also Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp., 46
NY2d 606, 611-612 [1979]; Westchester
County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 65 AD3d
1226, 1228 [2009]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the defendants'
motion which were to dismiss the causes of action sounding in breach of contract and breach of
the implied warranty of habitability insofar as asserted against Bristol House, Inc., with respect to
damages incurred within six years of commencement of the action, i.e., those claims that accrued
after April 15, 2010. Scheinkman, P.J., Duffy, Connolly and Christopher, JJ., concur.