Footnote 4:One of the hallmarks of the Williams second partial consent judgment is its set of elaborate notice and certification procedures which landlords must strictly comply with. (See e.g. Alawlaqi v Kelly, 175 Misc 2d 570, 571 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1997] [tenant's motion to dismiss holdover proceeding granted where, after NYCHA indicated it had no objection, landlord served the petition on NYCHA by regular mail only, and did not comply with the service requirements set forth in the Williams consent decree].)
Footnote 5:Nevertheless, the Appellate Division upheld the Appellate Term's decision upholding the decision of Housing Court Judge Malatzky and found this pleading defect to be a non-jurisdictional defense which the tenant had waived and which therefore did not warrant vacatur of the judgment and dismissal of the petition.
Footnote 6:Regarding respondent's point about the absence of proof of service of the notice of petition (as opposed to the petition) on the DHCR, even if the court were to find that proof of service of the "owner eviction notice" on the DHCR must be filed with the court, which it does not, the notice of petition is not an "owner eviction notice" under 24 CFR 982.310 (e) (2) (i), which defines such notice as "a notice to vacate, or a complaint or other initial pleading used under State or local law to commence an eviction action." The "petition" used in article 4 special proceedings, including summary eviction proceedings under article 7 of the RPAPL, is the initial pleading (see CPLR 402 [pleadings]; and compare CPLR 3011). The "notice of petition" (see
CPLR 403) is not a pleading; rather, it is one of the mechanisms (an order to