In the instant matter, the business judgment rule does not shield defendant from potential liability, since plaintiffs' claims are based on their contractual relationship with defendant pursuant to the Proprietary Lease, and defendant's alleged violation of that agreement. Id. Hence, the business judgment rule will not protect defendant for damages to plaintiffs caused by defendant's alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability or alleged breach of its covenant to make repairs. Nor does defendant cite any particular building policy that it seeks to enforce against plaintiff tenant shareholder in failing to comply with the warranty by timely prosecuting the repairs.
Lastly, the court grants that portion of defendant's cross-motion seeking to dismiss plaintiffs' fourteenth and fifteenth causes of action for libel.
CPLR 3016 (a) requires that in "an action for libel or slander, the particular words complained of shall be set forth in the complaint." This requirement is strictly enforced and the exact words must be set forth. Dismissal of these causes of action is mandated "[s]ince the actual defamatory words were never pleaded with particularity, but were only paraphrased in a manner such that the actual words were not evident from the face of the complaint." Murganti v Weber, 248 AD2d 208, 208 (1st Dept 1998); Hernandez v New York City Law Department Corporation Counsel, 258 AD2d 390 (1st Dept 1999). Further, "[t]he complaint also must allege the time, place and manner of the false statement and specify to whom it was made." Dillon v City of New York, 261 AD2d 34, 38 (1st Dept 1999).
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