Here, petitioner presents no evidence or documents disputing respondent's assertions. Rather, it merely submits its attorney's affirmation, which essentially fails to dispute any of respondent's allegations, and simply argues that the HDFC's involvement with the government "is fact specific". He presents no affidavit on anyone's personal knowledge or any documentation disputing any facts shown by respondent's supporting papers. This is entirely insufficient to defeat respondent's motion for summary judgment. Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 (1980).
Respondent has abundantly shown, without contradiction, that the government is sufficiently entwined with the operation of petitioner HDFC so that constitutional due process protections are triggered before respondent can be deprived of her home. Thus, mere expiration of respondent's lease or a thirty-day notice of termination alleging no cause for eviction is insufficient as a basis for this holdover proceeding. In 512 East 11th Street HDFC v Grimmet, 181 AD2d 488, 489 (1st Dept 1992), the certificate of incorporation of the HDFC there involved stated as its purpose, "... the development of a housing project for persons of low income." The deed from the City of New York to petitioner herein, restricts the use of the premises to "...a housing project for persons or families of low income...". (See respondent's exhibit "B", paragraph 4). As in Grimmet, the HDFC may not sell or otherwise dispose of the property without prior written approval of DHPD. (See respondent's exhibit "B", paragraph 3). Indeed, this matter is indistinguishable from the very facts and circumstances involved in 512 East 11th Street HDFC v Grimmet. The subject premises in this proceeding, like the premises in 157 West 123rd St. Tenants Assn v Hic