days if he did not cure the alleged breaches. 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) expressly states that the
landlord “may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit” until 30 days after
notice.
We conclude that the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) requires a landlord to
provide the tenant with a 30-day notice to vacate before requiring the tenant to vacate the
premises. The four 10-day pre-eviction notices that Pendleton Place gave to Asentista did not
meet that 30-day notice requirement. Therefore, we hold that the trial court could not grant relief
in Pendleton Place’s unlawful detainer action, and the writ of restitution order must be vacated
and the unlawful detainer action must be dismissed.
B. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Asentista requests attorney fees on appeal under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of
1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW.
RAP 18.1(a) provides that a party may have a right to recover reasonable attorney fees on
appeal if applicable law grants the prevailing party the right to do so. The RLTA authorizes an
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. RCW 59.18.290(2). Asentista is the prevailing
party on appeal. He was represented through the King County Bar Association Housing Justice
Project, but the prevailing party can recover attorney fees even if their attorneys provide
representation at no cost. Council House, Inc. v. Hawk, 136 Wn. App. 153, 159, 147 P.3d 1305
(2006). Therefore, we award Asentista his reasonable attorney fees and costs.
10
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No. 58118-3-II
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order directing issuance of a writ of restitution and remand