The motion is GRANTED.
The Court made rulings on the record regarding Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court
reiterates the key conclusions.
1. Tenant seeks dismissal of the present eviction under 9 V.S.A. § 4467(c) for failure to
provide the necessary 90 days of notice and for failure to provide timely notice of a rent
increase under 9 V.S.A. § 4455.
2. It is undisputed that Landlord provided 82 days of notice to tenant beginning May 10,
2024 and terminating the lease on August 1, 2024
3. This notice came after the expiration of the seven-month-term of the parties’ written
lease.
4. Landlord argues that Section 16 creates an on-going written lease that put any notice of
termination within 9 V.S.A. § 4467(e), which would only require 60 days of the notice.
5. Section 16 is entitled “Tenant’s Hold Over” and states that:
If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises with the consent of
Landlord after the natural expiration of this Agreement a new tenancy from
month-to-month shall be created between Landlord and Tenant which shall
be subject to all of the terms and conditions hereof except that rent shall
then be due and owing at One Thousand Dollars ($1000) per month and
except that such tenancy shall be terminable upon thirty (30) days written
notice served by either party.
6. The terms of this provisions offer several contradictory provisions and are at odds with
the Vermont Residential Rental Act. In particular, the last sentence of the term is in
violation of Vermont law, which requires no less than 60 days of notice even if there is a
written lease if the tenant has been there for more than two years. 9 V.S.A. § 4467(e).
Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 3
24-CV-03070 Darren Clark et al v. Gary Richards
7. Similarly, the term “Hold Over” has been defined to mean a tenant who retains
possession after the expiration of a lease or after a tenancy at will has been terminated.
Black’s Law Dictionary 658 (5th ed. 1979). Yet, Landlord seeks to assert this provisions
as a renew term and an extension of the written lease and its terms.
8. Vermont landlords have a duty to provide punctilious compliance with substantive
eviction proceedings. Vermont Small Business Development Corp. v. Fifth Sons Corp., 2013 VT
7, ¶ 15. This includes providing or applying provisions in a clear and straightforward
manner that does not put the tenant in the position of guessing the meaning of a
provision. Andrus v. Dunbar, 2005 VT 48, ¶ 13.
9. The Court denies the motion to dismiss to the extent that it is premised on the increase
in rent stated in the holdover provisions of Section 16 of the lease. The rise in rent is
not, in and of itself, unfair, and the placement of the term in the lease complies with the
notice provisions of 9 V.S.A. § 4455.
10. While it is not clear from the terms of the lease whether this holdover rent increase in
Section 16 was intended to be a negotiated increase that would raise the rent to
reasonable market rate over the ensuing month-to-month tenancy, or if it was intended
as a penalty amount to any tenant that held over is a factual dispute that the Court lacks
sufficient information from the pleadings to decide as a matter of law. Brigham v. State of
Vermont, 2005 VT 105, ¶ 11 (holding that the purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim is “to test the law of the claim, not the facts which support it.”) (quoting
Powers v. Office of Child Support, 173 Vt. 390, 395 (2002)).
11. As to the nature of the notice, however, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss
for lack of sufficient compliance with 9 V.S.A. § 4467(c).
12. Despite the language purporting to extend the written terms of the lease, the language of
the lease provisions in Section 16 indicate that it applies to a “hold over” situation—that
is a time when the lease has expired.
13. While Plaintiff points to language that would seem to extend the written terms of the
lease, it also contains language that is at odds with the Vermont Residential Rental Act’s
provisions, even if the written lease applied.
14. The undisputed facts also indicate that Plaintiff did not seek or attempt to terminate the
lease before the expiration of the written term but effectively terminated it immediately
after the end of the written lease term. Meaning that Plaintiff chose not to act when the
written lease was inarguably in effect, but also acting before even the first term of the
new month-to-month at will tenancy was completed. Thus, Plaintiff cannot look to the
practice of the parties to argue that the at-will tenancy was in effect a renewed and
continued as part of the written lease.
15. Given these differing terms and lack of clear evidence that would keep the written lease
alive past the April 30th expiration, the Court must, under the precedent of Andrus and
Vermont Small Business Development Corp. read the lease in a narrow manner favorable to