Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 178 Vt. 77 (2005)

Citation: Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 178 Vt. 77 (2005)
Parent Document: Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 178 Vt. 77 (2005)
Jurisdiction: Vermont (state)
Effective Date: 2005-01-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8209845/fletcher-hill-inc-v-crosbie/ ↗

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¶ 16. Significantly, with one exception, the cases cited by the dissent for the proposition that the net victor is the substantially prevailing party do not address the term “substantially prevailing party.” See De Witt,. 499 P.2d at 600 (statute awarded attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party”); Moss Constr. Co. v. Wulffsohn, 253 P.2d 483, 484-85 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (statute awarded attorney’s fees to the “successful party”); Corley v. Rivertown, Inc., 863 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (statute awarded attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party”); Szoboszlay v. Glessner, 664 P.2d 1327, 1333-34 (Kan. 1983) (statute awarded attorney’s fees to the “successful party”); Schmidt, 694 P.2d at 1345 (contract awarded fees to the “prevailing party”). Thus, these cases do not control our interpretation of § 4007(c). The U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out that these terms are not synonyms, observing that fee-shifting statutes “contain varying standards as to the precise degree of success necessary for an award of fees — such as whether the fee claimant was the ‘prevailing party,’ the ‘substantially prevailing’ party, or ‘successful.’ ” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, *84684 (1983) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit has observed that, in the context of a fee-shifting statute, “the term ‘substantially’... alters the amount or degree of recovery necessary to obtain fees.”- Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. INS, 336 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original).

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