Willard v. PARSONS HILL PARTNERSHIP, 2005 VT 69 (2005)

Citation: Willard v. PARSONS HILL PARTNERSHIP, 2005 VT 69 (2005)
Parent Document: Willard v. PARSONS HILL PARTNERSHIP, 2005 VT 69 (2005)
Jurisdiction: Vermont (state)
Effective Date: 2005-08-05
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2081593/willard-v-parsons-hill-partnership/ ↗

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¶ 51. The majority’s illogical approach is most apparent from its conclusion about the 2000 amendment to 9 Y.S.A. § 4458(a), which allows notice to come from “a governmental entity or a qualified independent inspector.” 1999, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 6. The majority concludes that: “[w]ith this amendment, the Legislature has now brought cases like plaintiffs’ within the ambit of the statute, thus supporting our view that the former § 4458(a) did not cover the entire range of habitability claims.” Ante, ¶ 24. Our law is that an amendment is intended to change the meaning of a statute unless a clarification of preexisting law is clearly indicated. See State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 178, 807 A.2d 454, 460 (2002); Tarrant v. Dep’t of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 198, 733 A.2d 733, 740 (1999); Jones v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 140 Vt. 552, 555, 442 A.2d 463, 464 (1982). In this case, the amendment adding a new class of persons who can provide notice is not clearly indicated as a clarification, and thus, it is intended to change the law. According to the majority’s theory, however, this change was unnecessary because the original law didn’t require notice for latent defects. The amendment is inconsistent with the majority’s holding that the RRAA does not apply to latent defects.

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